Political Ambition in Brazil, 1945-95: Theory and Evidence,” Working Paper

If politicians ’ behavior can be traced to their office goals, then rational-choice theories of politics must accurately describe politicians ’ office goals. In this paper, I explore the structure of high-level political careers in Brazil. I argue that one ought not assume that Brazilian congressional deputies desire to build a career within Congress. Instead, they value political jobs outside of Congress relatively more highly than building up seniority within Congress. To demonstrate the relatively low value deputies place on a career within Congress, I explore the rates at which Brazilian deputies run and win reelection since 1945, as well as the Brazilian Congress ’ lack of seniority norms and legislators ’ minor policy-making role. To demonstrate that Brazilian politicians value extra-congressional positions relatively highly, I will show that elected deputies often abandon their congressional seat immedately after election to take a position in municipal or state government, and also show that most after their relatively short congressional careers, deputies often return to positions in municipal and/or state government. My evidence confirms that Brazilian deputies do not act as “single-minded seekers of reelection, ” and that rational-choice theories of Brazilian (and comparative) politics need rethinking